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Do managers use meeting analyst forecasts to signal private information?  
– Evidence from patent citations  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study examines whether firms manage earnings to meet analyst forecasts to signal 
superior future performance. Prior research finds that firms use earnings management to just 
meet analyst forecasts and that these firms have a positive association with future 
performance (Bartov et al., 2002). There are two potential explanations for the positive 
association—signaling and attaining benefits that allow for better future performance (i.e., the 
real benefits explanation). Prior studies cannot provide evidence of signaling because they do 
not control for the real benefits explanation. Our research design enables us to control for the 
real benefits explanation because we can identify potential signaling firms within the sample 
of firms that just meet analyst forecasts. We use a unique database from the National Bureau 
of Economic Research to construct a proxy for the manager’s belief about future firm value 
due to patents. We find that firms with more patent citations are more likely to just meet the 
analyst forecast and manage earnings to achieve this goal. We also find firms that just meet 
analyst forecasts with more patent citations have significantly better performance than firms 
with fewer patent citations, which is consistent with signaling and not the real benefits 
explanation. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine the signaling hypothesis as an explanation for the discontinuity around 
zero analyst forecast errors. Several studies find that a disproportionate number of firms meet 
or slightly beat analyst forecasts (Degeorge et al., 1999; Payne and Robb, 2000; Burgstahler 
and Eames, 2003) and that firms manage earnings to meet this benchmark (Ayers et al., 2006; 
Matsumoto, 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et al., 2005). Prior literature also 
consistently finds a market premium and superior future performance for firms meeting 
analyst forecasts of earnings (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002). 
The positive association between just meeting earnings benchmarks and future 
performance is consistent with two explanations—signaling and attaining benefits that allow 
for better performance in the future (i.e., the real benefits explanation). The signaling 
explanation asserts that firms manage earnings to meet analyst forecasts to signal superior 
future performance. If meeting the forecast (via earnings management) is a credible signal 
about a firm’s favorable outlook, we would expect future performance to be better for firms 
that meet the target than for those that miss.  
The real benefits explanation, in contrast, suggests that the act of meeting an earnings 
benchmark may provide benefits, such as enhancing the firm’s credibility and reputation with 
stakeholders (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). These benefits could lead to stronger 
relationships with such stakeholders as customers, suppliers, and creditors, which could 
enhance future performance.1 
                                                 
1Another explanation for the discontinuity around zero analyst forecasts is managerial opportunism in which 
executives engage in earnings management to just meet analyst forecasts in an effort to exploit stakeholders, 
maximize personal gain, or mislead investors (Barua et al., 2006; Christensen et al., 2008; Matsunaga and Park, 
2001). However, managerial opportunism is inconsistent with a positive association between just meeting 
forecasts and future performance. 
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Our research objective is to investigate signaling after controlling for the confounding 
effect of the real benefits explanation. We examine a sample of patent-intensive firms that 
may have difficulty credibly communicating their future value. Management can 
communicate the level of research and development (R&D) expenditure and the number of 
patents created in a particular year but the underlying value of the patents is difficult to 
credibly communicate. Graham et al. (2005) report 74.1% of the 401 executives surveyed 
acknowledge they try to meet earnings benchmarks because it helps to convey growth 
prospects to investors, and prior literature documents that patent citations are indicators of 
future firm value (Deng et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005). Signaling by meeting the analyst 
forecast thus may be a way to communicate private information about future firm 
performance.  
Examining a sample of patent-intensive firms also allows us to identify potential 
signaling firms within the dichotomy of just meeting analyst forecasts. To test for signaling, 
we need a proxy for the manager’s unobservable information about future firm value. Prior 
literature provides evidence that the number of citations received by a patent is an indicator of 
its economic impact on future firm value (Hall et al., 2005; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; 
Deng et al., 1999; Trajtenberg, 1990). We use patent citations (i.e., citations received by a 
patent from future patents) to proxy for managers’ beliefs about firm growth prospects. By 
using this measure, we assume that ex post citation counts capture managers’ ex ante 
information about the quality of their firms’ patents and thus future firm performance. 
Consistent with this assumption, Ahuja et al. (2005) examine insider trading and find 
managers possess foresight about the value of their firms’ patents. We can obtain information 
on patent counts and citations from the NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File. Every patent 
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document contains information about the invention, the inventor, the assignee, and the 
technological antecedents of the invention (cited patents).  
To test the signaling hypothesis, we use a sample of 5,491 firm-years (653 firms) from 
1983–1998. First, we hypothesize that managers of firms with more valuable patents will 
signal future firm value by meeting analyst forecasts and find evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis. In the case of signaling, managers with more favorable private information about 
their firm’s growth prospects would be more likely to meet the analyst forecast relative to 
firms that just miss. The results hold after controlling for factors found in prior literature to 
influence the ability and cost of meeting/missing the analyst forecast such as book-to-market 
ratio, return on assets, size, industry and year (McVay et al., 2006; Jia, 2013). We employ 
several robustness checks to rule out any systematic bias in our patent citation measure.  
Second, we hypothesize that firms with more patent citations are more likely to 
manage earnings to meet the analyst forecast. For meeting the analyst forecast to be a 
signaling equilibrium, the signal must be costly, thus preventing firms with less favorable 
prospects from signaling. Firms with more patent citations can afford to manage earnings in 
costly ways because they expect that future earnings growth will outweigh the adverse impact 
of reversals of earnings management. We find that managers whose firms’ patent citations 
suggest positive information about future firm value are more likely to use income increasing 
earnings management to just meet the analyst forecast relative to firms with less positive 
information about future firm value.  
While the first two hypotheses explore whether just meeting the analyst forecast 
creates a separating equilibrium that is costly and undertaken by firms with better prospects 
(i.e., the necessary conditions for signaling), the third hypothesis is designed to test for 
signaling after controlling for the real benefits explanation. Specifically, we hypothesize that 
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firms with more patent citations have superior future performance even within the subsample 
of firms just meeting analyst forecasts. If the positive association between just meeting 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings and future performance depends on the manager’s belief about 
the firm’s growth prospects, this would be consistent with signaling.  
We find firms with more favorable information that just meet the earnings benchmark 
have significantly better future performance than firms with less favorable information that 
just meet the benchmark, even after controlling for factors previously found to influence 
future performance, such as current ROA, book-to-market ratio, size and R&D intensity 
(Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006). Overall, our results are consistent with signaling 
explaining the discontinuity around just meeting analyst forecasts for our sample of patent-
intensive industries.  
We contribute to the literature by providing evidence of signaling by meeting earnings 
benchmarks. Prior literature finds firms meeting benchmarks have superior future 
performance relative to firms not meeting earnings benchmarks (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002). 
Prior results also rule out managerial opportunism as a likely explanation for meeting earnings 
benchmarks but these results do not provide evidence of signaling. There are two explanations 
for the positive association between meeting earnings benchmarks and future performance: 
(1) managers signal future firm value by meeting earnings benchmarks, or (2) firms meeting 
these benchmarks attain benefits that enable better future performance. Our research design 
allows us to disentangle these explanations by partitioning potential signaling firms within the 
group that meets benchmarks. For firms meeting benchmarks, we identify managers’ ex ante 
information about the underlying value of the firm (i.e., firms with more patent citations). We 
find firms meeting benchmarks with more favorable patent-related information perform better 
than firms meeting benchmarks with less favorable information, consistent with signaling. We 
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also contribute to the literature by introducing a unique dataset to the accounting literature 
that proxies for managers’ private information about the underlying value of firm patents. 
Data on patents under application offer opportunities for researchers to study how various 
stakeholders communicate and use private information (Plumlee et al., 2013). 
2. Motivation and hypotheses development 
Our research is motivated by the lack of explanations for why firms manage earnings 
to meet analyst forecasts. Given the positive association between just meeting analyst 
forecasts and future performance, the evidence suggests signaling (or real benefits) rather than 
opportunism. However, the research design in prior literature limits the ability to draw 
inferences regarding signaling because prior studies do not control for the confounding 
influence of the real benefits explanation. 
Several studies indicate that firms face pressure to meet or beat analyst consensus 
forecasts (Brown and Caylor, 2005; Graham et al., 2005) and find a disproportionate number 
of firms that meet or slightly beat analysts’ forecasts (Degeorge et al., 1999; Payne and Robb, 
2000; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003). Several papers also find evidence of earnings 
management to meet the analyst forecast. For example, Payne and Robb (2000) show firms 
use income-increasing abnormal accruals to just meet the analyst forecast. Barua et al. (2006) 
also find accruals management to achieve earnings benchmarks. Similarly, firms in the UK 
appear to use accrual management and classification shifting to just meet earnings 
benchmarks (Athansakou et al., 2009; Athansakou et al., 2011), and firms in Canada seem to 
manage earnings to meet voluntary earnings forecasts in the initial public offering setting 
(Cormier et al. 2014).  
Earnings management around benchmarks can be opportunistic, or it can be consistent 
with shareholder value maximization. The managerial opportunism explanation asserts that 
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earnings management to meet analyst forecasts allows executives to exploit other 
stakeholders, to maximize personal gain, or to mislead investors. For example, managers’ 
incentives to trade in their own firm’s stock (McVay et al. 2006) or meet goals in executive 
compensation contracts (Matsunaga and Park, 2001) could influence whether they manage 
earnings to meet benchmarks. If opportunism explains why managers use earnings 
management to meet earnings benchmarks, future performance should be lower for these 
firms because earnings management decisions reverse in subsequent periods. However, prior 
literature finds evidence that firms are rewarded with higher than expected returns for meeting 
analyst forecasts (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002). Prior literature likewise finds a positive 
association between just meeting analyst forecasts and future performance even when firms 
use earnings management to achieve analysts’ expectations of earnings (Athansakou et al., 
2011; Bartov et al., 2002).  
Although the evidence is not consistent with opportunism, it is difficult to attribute the 
results of prior literature exclusively to signaling because the act of meeting the analyst 
forecast could allow firms to perform better in the future (which is distinct from signaling). 
On the one hand, prior literature has proposed signaling future earnings growth as an 
explanation for the positive association between just meeting analysts’ forecasts and future 
performance. Xue (2003), for example, finds that firms with higher information asymmetry 
exhibit a more pronounced discontinuity around earnings thresholds and firms that just meet 
thresholds have better operating performance than those that just miss. Her findings suggest 
that firms with information-constrained environments may use meeting a threshold to signal 
favorable prospects.  
On the other hand, the real benefits explanation is also plausible. The act of meeting 
an analyst forecast may provide benefits such as enhancing the firm’s credibility and 
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reputation with stakeholders (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). These benefits could lead to 
stronger relationships with customers, suppliers, creditors, or all three, which would allow 
firms to thrive in the future. 
2.1 Hypotheses 
Our main objective is to test for signaling as the explanation for the positive 
association between meeting earnings benchmarks and future performance. Therefore 
hypotheses one and two focus on whether the results of prior literature are similar for our 
sample. More specifically, we examine whether firms with more patent citations are more 
likely to meet the analyst forecast relative to firms with fewer patent citations (hypothesis 
one) and whether firms with more patent citations are more likely to use earnings 
management to achieve this goal (hypothesis two). Taken together, these two hypotheses are 
designed to explore whether just meeting the analyst forecast creates a separating equilibrium 
(consistent with signaling) that is costly and undertaken only by firms with better prospects. 
Hypothesis three, for its part, focuses on testing for signaling after controlling for the real 
benefits explanation. More specifically, we examine whether firms with more patent citations 
have superior performance even within the subsample of firms just meeting analyst forecasts. 
We develop each hypothesis in more detail below.  
In the case of signaling, managers with more favorable private information about their 
firm’s underlying growth prospects would be more likely to meet the analyst forecast relative 
to firms that just miss (or just beat) the analyst forecast. Managers with favorable information 
about the underlying value of their patents can either directly or indirectly communicate (i.e., 
signal) their effect on future firm value. Direct disclosure about the underlying value of firms’ 
patents by managers involves proprietary costs that could give rise to the need for signaling. 
To minimize proprietary costs, management may choose to delay direct communication of 
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their innovations from the application year to the grant year, at which point details of the 
patents will be announced by U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.2 During the application year, 
management with high-quality patents under application may have incentives to indirectly 
communicate their favorable information via signaling to separate themselves from firms with 
less favorable future firm growth prospects. This leads to our first hypothesis:  
H1: Firms with more patent citations are more likely to just meet the analyst forecast 
relative to firms with fewer patent citations 
 
When used as a signal, meeting analyst forecasts should result in a separating 
equilibrium between firms with favorable future growth prospects and firms with less 
favorable prospects because the net costs of managing earnings to meet analyst forecasts 
differs for these two groups. Prior studies document that firms manage earnings to meet 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings (Ayers et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Graham et al., 2005). Firms managing accruals will face an adverse effect on future earnings 
as the past manipulations reverse.  
Firms with favorable future growth prospects can afford to undertake costly earnings 
management because future earnings growth will outweigh the cost of reversals of earnings 
management. This argument is consistent with Graham et al. (2005), who report executives 
consider increased uncertainty about firm prospects to be the number one consequence of 
missing earnings benchmarks. In order for meeting analysts’ forecasts to be a separating 
equilibrium consistent with signaling, we expect firms with more patent citations to engage in 
more costly earnings management activities relative to firms with fewer citations. Firms with 
                                                 
2The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 requires information about patent applications to be published 
approximately 18 months after the application has been filed (for patents filed on or after November 29, 2000). 
However, publication can be avoided by filing a certificate stating the patent has not been applied for in another 
country that requires disclosure.    
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more patent citations expect that future earnings growth will outweigh the cost of earnings 
management reversals. This leads to our second hypothesis:  
H2: Firms with more patent citations are more likely to use earnings management to 
just meet the analyst’s forecast of earnings relative to firms with fewer patent citations. 
 
Lastly, for signaling to be the explanation for the positive association between just 
meeting analysts’ forecasts and future firm performance versus the alternative explanation of 
attaining real benefits that allow better future performance, we must control for the benefits of 
meeting analysts’ forecasts. Specifically, we partition potential signaling firms within the 
dichotomy of meeting the analyst forecast. Within the sample of firms just meeting analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings, we examine the interaction of just meeting analyst forecasts and patent 
citations on future firm performance. If signaling is the explanation, we would expect a 
positive association between the interaction and future firm performance. This would suggest 
that the positive association between just meeting analysts’ forecasts of earnings and future 
performance depends on the manager’s belief about the firm’s growth prospects, consistent 
with signaling. On the other hand, if just meeting analysts’ forecasts of earnings enables firms 
to attain better performance, the interaction should not be positive. In this case, the benefits 
should not depend on the manager’s belief about future firm growth prospects. This leads to 
our third hypothesis. 
H3: Firms with more patent citations that just meet the analyst’s forecast of earnings 
have superior future performance relative to firms with fewer patent citations 
 
3. Why patent value could be difficult to credibly communicate 
Prior research suggests that managers know more about the underlying value of their 
firms’ patents than investors (Ahuja et al., 2005), even when investors have the aid of 
financial intermediaries (Deng et al., 1999). Managers with favorable patent information can 
either directly disclose or indirectly communicate through signaling the underlying future firm 
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value due to patents. Direct disclosure about the underlying value of firms’ patents could 
involve costs related to competition (i.e. proprietary costs), litigation, and disclosure. The 
substantial costs of direct disclosure (discussed in the next few paragraphs) could give rise to 
the need for signaling in our setting. 
Proprietary costs may affect a firm’s decision to disclose patent details. To minimize 
proprietary costs, a manager may choose to delay direct communication of an innovation until 
the patent grant date, at which point the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office announces the 
details. During the patent-pending period (i.e., the time between the application and grant), 
direct disclosure of patent details could entail proprietary costs because competitors could 
reverse engineer the patent or develop substitute innovations (Wagenhofer 1990). Therefore, 
during the application year, managers with high-quality pending patents may have incentives 
to indirectly communicate their favorable information via signaling to separate themselves 
from firms with low-quality patents.  
Litigation costs could also affect a firm’s decision to directly disclose patent details. 
Even if the manager directly disclosed specific details of a patent, investors could have 
difficulty estimating the precise financial impact (i.e., future cash flows) of an innovation due 
to the specialization and uncertain nature of technological innovations. And managers may be 
reluctant to reveal their estimates of the financial impact of a technological innovation given 
litigation costs associated with inaccurate earnings estimates. 
Credibility is another potential obstacle to direct disclosure. As with any disclosure of 
positive information, management faces a potential credibility problem when disclosing 
information about an innovation and its impact on future performance. A firm with a low 
quality patent could mimic a firm with a high quality patent by disclosing information about 
its patents under consideration. There is a very low cost to file a patent application, and not 
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every patent application results in a patent (72% in 2000). In addition, deciding whether an 
innovation warrants a patent requires considerable expertise and time. 3  Managers with 
favorable information about future firm value due to high quality pending patents may have 
an incentive to signal to separate themselves from low quality firms. These firms can afford to 
manage earnings in costly ways to meet the analyst’s forecast of earnings because they expect 
future earnings growth to outweigh the cost of the reversals of their earnings management.4 
For our sample of patent-intensive firms, all of these costs could contribute to the need for 
signaling. 
4. Sample selection  
We obtain information on patents from the NBER U.S. Patent Citations Data File,5 
which has information on all the utility patents granted from January 1, 1963, through 
December 30, 1999.6 The files contain information about the patent on the grant date (when 
the patent office granted the patent) and the application date (when the inventor filed for the 
patent). Since the inventor has an incentive to apply for a patent soon after the innovation, 
Hall et al. (2001) recommend the use of the application date as the relevant time for the 
patent. The grant date depends on the review process at the Patent Office, which takes on 
average two years. Therefore we classify patents by the application year and use the period 
from 1983 to 1998.7  
For every CUSIP and year, we obtain the number of patents and the number of 
citations received on those patents. After matching the NBER data to Compustat by CUSIP, 
                                                 
3See http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Dudas080227.pdf 
4Since managers have incentives to signal closer to the application date, we conduct sensitivity analysis using the 
grant date to measure Patent Importance and do not find evidence of signaling.   
5We thank Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg for sharing the data.   
6There are three types of patents: utility, design, and plant. The majority of patents are utility patents.  
7We start in 1983 because that is when analyst forecasts are first available. We exclude 1999 data to allow time 
for application dates to be revealed at the grant date.  
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we have 18,515 observations with grant dates from 1963-1999. We restrict the sample by 
deleting observations (1) without analyst forecast data on I/B/E/S (which starts in 1983) and 
(2) without sufficient data to calculate the control variables (including research and 
development expense). Next, we exclude firms in the financial and utility industries (standard 
industrial classification: 6000-7000 and 4400-5000) because they operate in highly regulated 
industries with accounting rules that differ from those in other industries. As such, our proxy 
for earnings management (discretionary accruals) might not be suitable as a proxy for 
earnings management behavior in these industries. These restrictions reduce our sample to 
5,491 firm-years (653 firms).  
5. Variable measurement 
5.1 Patent citations 
A patent for an invention grants property rights to the inventor and is issued by the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The term of a patent is 20 years from the date on which the 
application for the patent is filed. The patent grants “the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the U.S. Every patent document contains 
information about the invention, the inventor, the assignee, and the technological antecedents 
of the invention (cited patents). The patent approval process involves a number of formal 
steps, including the application for a patent (i.e., application date) and the issuance of the 
patent (i.e., grant date).    
We use the number of patent citations received as a proxy for the value of the firms 
underlying patents. Prior literature finds that patent citations received convey information 
about two aspects of innovation: (1) spillovers along geographical and institutional 
dimensions (Jaffe et al., 1993) and (2) individual economic importance or value (Hall et al., 
2005; Trajteberg, 1990). Other measures, such as R&D intensity (measuring input, the ratio of 
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R&D expense to total assets) and patent yield (measuring output, the ratio of the number of 
patents to R&D expense), typically do not capture value generated from innovations for 
various reasons. First, input based measures, such as R&D, are noisy because innovation, by 
its nature, is risky. Moreover, patents tend to vary enormously in their technological or 
economic importance. Patent yields or patent counts cannot capture this heterogeneity and are 
thus limited as proxies for underlying patent value (Griliches et al., 1991).   
The evidence in prior literature suggests patent citations received are a reasonable 
proxy for future firm value due to patents. In general, these studies find that various patent 
importance proxies constructed from patent citation data explain cross-sectional differences in 
firm market valuations (Deng et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005).8 Hall et al., (2005) find that an 
extra citation increases market value of the patent by 3%, while Lanjouw and Schankerman 
(2004) show that citations predict which patents will be renewed and which will be litigated 
(both of which are measures of value). Trajtenberg (1990) focuses on the relationship between 
a patent’s social value (including positive externalities) and patent characteristics. He finds 
that patents associated with a major innovation in medical technology—computed 
tomography (CT) scanners—were cited more frequently but had no correlation with patent 
counts. Harhoff et al. (1999) focus on the private value of patents and ask German holders of 
U.S. patents for how much they would be willing to sell the patent right three years after 
filing. They find that the estimated value is correlated with the number of citations received in 
the subsequent three years. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that managers possess 
foresight about the underlying value of their patents based on citations (Ahuja et al., 2005) 
                                                 
8We replicate these findings for our sample of firms and find patent importance is significantly and positively 
associated with abnormal returns in all of the subsequent three years. 
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and that investors do not fully understand the quality of patents even with the aid of financial 
intermediaries (Deng et al., 1999)  
Given this evidence, we use patent citations received as a proxy for managers ex ante 
information about the underlying value of firm patents. However, citations are only 
meaningful when used comparatively. Thus we need to choose the best benchmark for 
comparison. Our variable of interest, Patent importance, is the mean number of patent 
citations received on firm j’s patents applied for in year t divided the mean number of patent 
citations received on all patents applied for in year t by all firms.9 We measure the variable as 
follows: Adj_CITEj,t = CITEj,t /  [
 
CITEi ,t
i 1
N
¦ / N], where CITE j,t is the total citations received 
through year 2000 for patent j that was applied for in year t. N is the total number of patents 
applied for in year t. 
 
CITEi ,t
i 1
N
¦  is the sum of total citations received through 2000 for all patents 
applied for in year t. Next, Patent Importance for firm x at year t is calculated as follows:  
Patent Importancex,t  = [¦ 
K
j
tjCITEAdj
1
,_ /K], where K is the total number of patents from firm 
x that were applied for in year t. 
Following Hall et al. (2001), we choose overall patent citations for the same year as 
the comparative benchmark to control for any systematic variations in patent citations over 
time. This approach controls for effects due to (1) truncation,10 (2) any systematic changes 
                                                 
9We use the application date since the inventor has an incentive to apply for a patent soon after the innovation 
(Hall et al., 2001). More importantly, we are investigating signaling by just meeting analyst forecasts, and 
managers have no incentive to signal the underlying value of firm patents once the details of the patent are 
publicly disclosed.  
10Patents applied for in 1983 will have 16 subsequent years to receive citations. Patents applied for in 1995 only 
have four subsequent years to receive citations. Weighting by year treats a patent that received six citations for 
which the average patent received five citations in that year as equivalent to a patent that received 12 citations 
but belongs to a year in which the average was 10 citations. 
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over time in the propensity to cite, and (3) changes in the number of patents making 
citations.11 In the sensitivity analysis, we perform several robustness checks to ensure neither 
benchmark choice nor truncation drives our results. We use two other variables to capture the 
innovative process: patent yield and R&D intensity. Patent yield is the ratio of the number of 
patents to R&D expense (in millions). R&D intensity is the ratio of R&D expense to total 
assets.  
5.2 Earnings threshold 
We use the analyst unadjusted mean consensus forecast as the earnings threshold 
managers want to meet if they have optimistic inside information. Specifically, we use the 
annual consensus analyst forecast, which is the mean earnings per share (EPS) forecast 
computed over the set of the analysts’ most recent forecasts. We only use forecasts within two 
months of the annual earnings release date to reduce the influence of stale forecasts (McVay 
et al., 2006). We use the I/B/E/S forecasts that are unadjusted for stock splits (Diether et al. 
2002). Following McVay et al. (2006) and Jia (2013), we classify the firms in the following 
way. Firms “just meeting” are those with realized EPS that meets consensus analyst forecast 
by zero or one cent. Firms “just missing” are those with realized EPS that misses consensus 
analyst forecast by one or two cents. Firms “just beating” are those with realized EPS that 
meets consensus analyst forecast by two or three cents.  
6. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample of 5,491 firm-years (653 firms) 
for which we have data on analyst forecast and patents. The average number of patents for 
each firm-year is 41.2 and median is 7, consistent with the notion these are patent-intensive 
                                                 
11The limitation of this approach is that it does not separate any “real” effects over time. However, attempting to 
control for these “real” effects requires more assumptions and could induce even more measurement error.  
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firms. The mean (median) number of patent citations is 5.5 (4.0), and mean (median) R&D 
expense is $141.6 million ($21.5 million). For the three innovation measures used in prior 
literature: patent yield has mean (median) of 0.749 (0.380); patent importance has mean 
(median) of 1.003 (0.761); R&D intensity has mean (median) of 0.058 (0.04).12 Hall et al. 
(2005) report higher patent yield and R&D intensity for their sample of 12,118 firm-years 
during 1979-1988. The difference is primarily due to the fact we have fewer small firms 
because we require data on analyst forecasts.  
Table 2 reports the industry composition (defined by two-digit SIC code) and industry 
R&D intensity. The five most highly represented industries for our sample are industrial 
machinery and equipment, chemicals and allied products, electrical and electronic equipment, 
instruments and related products, and transportation equipment. These industries all have 
significant industry investments in R&D. The chemical and allied products industry, for 
example, spends on average 7.3% of assets on R&D investment, while the industrial 
machinery and equipment industry likewise spends on average 6.6% of assets. Consistent 
with prior evidence (Degeorge et al., 1999; Payne and Robb, 2000; Burgstahler and Eames, 
2003), we find disproportionate numbers of firms just meeting analyst forecasts compared to 
firms just missing or just beating the forecasts. Out of 5,491 firm-years, 767 firm-years just 
meet the forecast by 0 or 1 cent; 522 firm-years just miss by 1 or 2 cents; and 576 firm-years 
beat the forecast by 2 and 3 cents. The discontinuity around the threshold does not appear to 
be driven by any particular industry.  
7. Results 
7.1 Testing Hypothesis 1:  Meeting Analyst Forecasts to Signal 
                                                 
12Chan et al. (2001) report R&D intensity for all Compustat firms engaged in R&D as 3.75% in 1995.  
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Our regression specification is the following logit regression to examine the 
characteristics of firms that just meet the analyst forecast versus firms that just miss the 
forecast (including year and industry fixed effects): 
Just Meetingt = γ0 + γ1Patent Yieldt + γ2Patent Importancet + γ3R&D Intensityt + γ4ROAt  
 + γ5BTMt + γ6SIZEt + εt                                                                      (1)  
   
Just Meeting = An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS beats the 
analyst forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses the 
analyst forecast by one or two cents 
Patent Yield = the number of patents divided by research and development expense 
 Patent Importance = the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents 
divided by the mean number of patent citations received in the 
current year for all firms 
 R&D Intensity = research and development expense divided by total assets    
 ROA = operating income divided by assets  
 BTM = the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity 
 SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of 
the year  
  
 
Hypothesis one predicts that γ2 will be positive, indicating firms that are more likely to 
meet the analyst forecast to signal optimistic future firm value have more important patents 
than firms just missing. We include Patent Yield in the regression to control for the total 
number of patents. Although Hall et al. (2005) find that Patent Yield is not an indicator of 
underlying patent value, we include it to control for the overall patent generation profile of the 
firm; however, we do not expect γ1 to be significant. We include R&D Intensity in the 
regression to control for the accounting effects of R&D. Under current accounting rules, R&D 
expenditures must be expensed as incurred because of the uncertainty of future benefits 
(SFAS No. 2, October 1974).13 Thus R&D may influence the ability of the firm to meet the 
earnings expectation.  
                                                 
13FASB permits R&D to be capitalized only for certain kinds of software (SFAS 86).   
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We include three control variables that may influence whether a firm just misses 
versus just meets the earnings expectation: book-to-market, return on assets, and size. Skinner 
and Sloan (2002) show high-growth firms are associated with a more negative stock price 
reaction from missing the analyst forecast than nongrowth firms. Therefore we include BTM 
to control for growth firms. ROA controls for performance; SIZE controls for size in terms of 
the market value of equity.  
Table 3 presents univariate statistics for firms that just meet the analyst forecast versus 
just miss it. The univariate statistics in table 3 show that firms just meeting forecasts have 
significantly higher mean patent importance compared to firms just missing (1.195 vs. 0.977), 
with no significant difference on patent yield. The univariate statistics also reveal that firms 
just missing the forecast have lower ROA than firms just meeting. This suggests that, on 
average, firms that meet analyst forecasts perform better. Firms that just miss the analyst 
forecast have higher BTM. This suggests that value firms (i.e., higher BTM) are more likely 
to miss the analyst forecast, consistent with Skinner and Sloan (2002), who show that the 
costs of missing are higher for growth firms (i.e., lower BTM). The univariate statistics 
highlight the importance of controlling for these differences in the regression analysis. 
Next, we estimate the likelihood of just meeting versus just missing analyst forecasts 
controlling for BTM, ROA, Size, industry, and year. The results are presented in table 4. We 
find patent importance significantly increases the likelihood of just meeting analyst forecasts 
(coefficient=0.149 and p value=0.01) after controlling for the characteristic differences 
between the two groups. In contrast, the likelihood of just meeting forecasts is not explained 
by patent yield. These different results (γ1 versus γ2) increase our confidence that our 
hypothesis 1 testing does not capture an omitted variable that could be correlated with the 
overall patent generation profile of the firm. Overall, it appears that firms are more likely to 
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meet the analyst forecast if they have more favorable private information about their 
underlying growth prospects (i.e., more patent citations). This result suggests signaling.  
7.2 More Considerations for Testing Hypothesis 1 
7.2.1 Data Truncation and Measurement  
 As discussed in section 5.1, the data truncation problem is one unavoidable limitation 
of using the NBER patent citations database. Our variable of interest, Patent Importance, is 
constructed using a comparative benchmark of overall patent citations for the same year (i.e., 
the fixed-effects approach to mitigate concerns about data truncation). To show our results are 
not driven by the truncation correction method or truncation, we perform two robustness tests 
(untabulated). First, we use an alternative measure of patent importance that does not adjust 
for truncation. We use the average number of patent citations divided by the number of 
patents in the current year, and our coefficient on this alternative proxy is similar in 
magnitude and significance. Second, since truncation should affect the earlier years less than 
it affects more recent ones, we estimate the likelihood of meeting analyst forecast for two 
earlier sample periods. The coefficient on patent importance is significantly positive using the 
sample period from 1983-1993 and the sample period from 1983-1987. In addition, the 
coefficients on Patent Importance for these two regressions are not significantly different. 
The consistency of results across each subsample leads us to believe that our inferences are 
not affected by truncation.  
7.2.2 Hypothesis 1: Three Alternative Explanations  
In this section we describe three alternative explanations for the findings presented in 
7.1 and describe the sensitivity tests we implement to mitigate concerns about alternative 
explanations. We hypothesize that managers of firms with more valuable patents will signal 
future firm value by meeting analyst forecasts and find evidence consistent with this 
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hypothesis. We use a measure calculated from ex post data to proxy for management’s private 
information of patent value and assume there is no systematic bias. One violation of this 
assumption could be that patents at financially more successful firms enjoy higher visibility 
and are more likely to influence work in the same field, which would lead to more citations. If 
firms just meeting the analyst forecast are more successful than firms just missing forecasts 
and hence enjoy greater visibility and more citations, our results could be mechanical. 
We design a test to explicitly rule out this possibility. If such a mechanical relationship 
exists, we would expect firms just beating the analyst forecasts (by two or three cents) to 
invite more citations than firms just meeting forecasts by the same logic (beating firms are 
more successful and enjoy higher visibility than just meeting firms). On the other hand, if our 
results reflect signaling, we would not expect beating firms to have more citations than just 
meeting firms because signaling firms would not engage in more costly earnings management 
than necessary (i.e., signaling firms would just meet but not beat analysts’ expectations due to 
higher signaling costs). 
 Table 5 presents the results from a logistic regression comparing patent importance 
between the just meeting and beating samples. We find firms that just meet the forecast have 
even higher patent importance than firms beating the forecast (coefficient=0.121 and p 
value=0.02). The results presented in tables 4 and 5 suggest firms just meeting forecasts have 
favorable information about the underlying value of patents.  
Another alternative explanation for our results is that firms with more valuable patents 
have earnings that are easier to predict, making them more likely to meet the analyst forecast. 
A biotechnology firm with no products, for example, would require the analyst to predict only 
expense (e.g., R&D and SG&A), which is easier to predict than a firm with both revenue and 
expense. To rule out this explanation, we control for revenue variability over the past five 
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years (i.e., standard deviation of revenue) in tables 4 and 5. The results—that just meeting 
firms have favorable information about the underlying value of patents compared to just 
beating or missing firms—are robust at a 1% level.  
The third alternative explanation is that an omitted correlated variable, such as 
managerial talent, explains the positive association between meeting analysts’ forecasts and 
patent importance. If patent importance proxies for managerial ability, we would expect 
managers of high patent-importance firms to meet the analyst forecast not only in t but also in 
t-1 since managerial ability should not change systematically from year t-1 and year t.14 From 
table 1, it appears the variable Just Meeting is serially correlated—the correlation between 
Just Meetingt and Just Meetingt-1 is 0.09 (table 1B). Just Meetingt-1 is also correlated with 
various independent variables that we employ (table 1B). This highlights the necessity of 
formal testing through regression analysis. Table 6 presents the results of a regression of Just 
Meeting in period t-1 on the patent innovation variables (Patent Yield, Patent Importance, 
R&D Intensity) in period t-1 and control variables (ROA, BTM, SIZE) in period t-1. We do not 
find that higher patent importance firms just meet the forecast in t-1 (coefficient=0.003 and p 
value=0.96), suggesting that the result in table 4 is not driven by managerial ability.  
7.3 Testing Hypothesis 2: Managing Earnings to Signal 
After finding firms with more patents are more likely to meet analyst forecasts in 7.1 
and 7.2, we next investigate whether they achieve this outcome by engaging in costly earnings 
management. There is evidence that firms just meeting the forecast engage in accruals 
management (Ayers et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2002). We examine whether firms with more 
patent citations are more likely to manage earnings to meet the analyst forecast. Our 
                                                 
14Management ability does not change every year (Bushman et al., (1996) report the median of CEO tenure is 5 
years). Furthermore, there is no reason to believe management ability changes contemporaneously with patent 
importance given the long duration and uncertainty of R&D activities.  
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regression specification is the following logit regression to examine the earnings management 
characteristics of firms that just meet the analyst forecast versus firms that just miss 
(including year and industry fixed effects): 
Just Meetingt = β0 + β1Patent Yieldt + β2Patent Importancet + β3R&D Intensityt + β4Accrualst 
  + β5Accruals*Patent Importancet + β6ROAt + β7BTMt + β8SIZEt + εt       (2) 
All variables as previously defined in model (1) except Accruals. If firms with 
favorable private information are more likely to use earnings management to just meet the 
analyst forecast relative to firms with less favorable private information, we would expect the 
interaction coefficient (β5) to be positive. We use the modified-Jones model to calculate our 
measure of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995). To estimate abnormal accruals 
(Accruals), we perform the following cross-sectional regressions for each two-digit SIC code 
containing at least 15 companies in each year for the entire population of Compustat 
companies (Dechow et al., 1995):  
TAj,t /Aj,t-1 = D 1,t /Aj,t-1 + D 2,t (∆REVj,t - ∆ARj,t)/Aj,t-1            (3) 
ETAj,t /Aj,t-1 = D 1,t /Aj,t-1 + D 2,t (∆REVj,t - ∆ARj,t)/Aj,t-1            (4) 
TA = total accruals 
A = total assets 
ΔREV = net sales in year t less net sales in year t-1 
ΔAR = accounts receivable in year t less accounts receivable in year t-1 
ROA = operating income divided by total assets 
 
Total accruals (TA) are estimated from the balance sheet as change in current assets 
minus change in current liabilities minus change in cash plus change in short-term debt minus 
depreciation and amortization expense.15 A is total assets; ΔREV equals net sales in year t less 
net sales in year t-1; ΔAR equals accounts receivable in year t less accounts receivable in year 
                                                 
15Although Collins and Hribar (2002) suggest calculating accruals from the statement of cash flows mitigates 
concerns about the effects of acquisitions and foreign currency translation adjustments, operating cash flows 
from the statement of cash flows is only available after 1988.  
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t-1. We use the industry-year specific parameter estimates from (3) to estimate expected 
accruals (ETA) using model (4). Our measure of discretionary accruals (Accruals) equals TAj,t 
/Aj,t-1 minus ETAj,t/Aj,t-1. 
 The results from estimating equation (2) are presented in table 7. First, we find patent 
importance significantly increases the likelihood of just meeting the analyst forecast (i.e., the 
coefficient on patent importance is similar in magnitude and significance to the coefficient 
reported in table 4). We also find that firms with favorable patent information are more likely 
to engage in income increasing accruals management to meet the analyst forecast (i.e., β5 is 
significantly positive). This supports our hypothesis that firms with favorable information 
about their underlying patents undertake costly earning management activities to signal future 
firm value. These firms can afford the costly signal because they expect that future earnings 
growth will outweigh the adverse impact of reversals of earnings management.16   
7.4 Testing Hypothesis 3:  Superior Future Performance of Signaling Firms 
This section provides evidence on an important necessary condition regarding the 
signaling explanation, that signaling firms experience superior future performance even after 
controlling the confounding effect of real benefits. We examine whether firms with more 
patent citations have superior future performance even within the subsample of firms just 
meeting analyst forecasts. Similar to Core et al. (1999), we specify the following OLS 
regression (including industry and year fixed effects):  
ROAt+i = µ0 + µ1Patent Yieldt + µ2Patent Importancet + µ3R&D Intensityt + µ4Just Meetingt  
                    + µ5Just Meeting*Patent Importancet + µ6stdROAt + µ7log(Sales)t + µ7BTMt  
   + µ8logMVt + µ9ROAt + εt                                                                                                                            (5) 
 
                                                 
16Prior research indicates that abnormal accrual proxies (e.g., the modified Jones model) may increase in 
earnings (Kasznik, 1999; Dechow et al., 1995, 2003), which biases towards our finding. However, Ayers et al. 
(2006) find that this issue is less problematic for the analysts forecast benchmark.  
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where i = 1,2,3. 
All variables are as previously defined in model (1). Future performance is measured 
using return on assets (operating income plus research and development expense divided by 
total assets) in year t+1, t+2, and t+3. Following Bharat and Kini (2008), Dorrough and 
Rangan (2005) and Raman and Shahrur (2008), we add back R&D expense to operating 
income. This adjustment controls for any potential spurious correlation between current R&D 
intensity and subsequent profitability.17 In addition, we use an accounting-based measure of 
performance instead of a market-based measure (e.g., stock returns, Tobin’s Q) because 
market based measures are susceptible to investor expectations. If favorable future prospects 
are credibly communicated to investors via signaling, long-term stock returns will not 
necessarily be superior for the signaling firms because investors will have already impounded 
this information into price. ROA is widely used in accounting and finance to measure future 
firm performance (e.g., Core et. al., 1999; Larcker et. al., 2007). 
For meeting the analyst forecast to be a credible signal, we would expect firms with 
favorable information about the underlying value of their patents to undertake costly earnings 
management because they expect that future earnings growth will outweigh the cost of 
reversals of earnings management. The specification of equation (5) allows us to test for 
signaling while controlling for the real benefits explanation. Under the real benefits 
explanation, just meeting analysts’ forecasts allow firms to attain real benefits that result in 
better future performance; therefore, researchers would observe a positive association 
between future firm performance and just meeting analysts’ forecasts, even in the absence of 
signaling. When estimating equation (5), µ4 captures the benefits of meeting the benchmark. 
If signaling is the explanation, firms with favorable information about the value of their 
                                                 
17 Our results are similar without this adjustment. 
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underlying patents will signal by meeting the analyst forecast, thus the coefficient for the 
interaction term µ5 should be positive after controlling for just meeting the analyst forecast 
(Just Meeting). In contrast, if real benefits is the explanation, µ4 should be positive and µ5 
should not be significant, because meeting the analyst forecast is the benefit and should not 
depend on the manager’s belief about future firm value.  
Table 8 reports our findings: µ4 is not significant in any specification, and µ5 is 
significantly positive for two specifications. Thus firms with favorable patent information that 
meet analyst forecasts have statistically and economically higher ROA in t+1 
(coefficient=0.005 and p=0.06) and t+2 (coefficient=0.006 and p=0.06).18 Taken together with 
the results reported earlier, our evidence is consistent with the signaling explanation because 
(1) firms with favorable patent information signal by undertaking costly earnings management 
to meet analyst forecasts; (2) signaling firms’ prospects are favorable enough that they can 
afford costly signaling because their future performance is superior compared to other firms. 
7.5 Industry Effects  
We conduct sensitivity analyses for all three hypotheses to ensure our results are not 
driven by the industry effects. Our approach to measuring Patent Importance (i.e., comparing 
patents to all patents in the same year) controls for systematic changes over time in the 
propensity to cite and changes over time in the number of patents making citations. However, 
it does not control for potential differences across industries. We implement several tests to 
mitigate concerns that our results are driven by industry differences. First, all our regressions 
include industry dummies, which control for industry effects. Second, in table 2, we explore 
differences in patent citations for the four most represented industries in the “Just Meeting 
                                                 
18 Although, we do not find that these firms perform better in year t+3, the overall evidence on future 
performance is consistent with hypothesis three. 
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Analyst Forecast” sample and find no statistical difference between these four industries. 
Third, we construct an alternative Patent Importance variable that takes into consideration 
variation in industry patent citations. Patent_Importance_Industry is the mean number of 
patent citations received on current year patents divided the mean number of patent citations 
received in the current year for firms in the same two-digit SIC code. Our results are 
qualitatively similar using this alternative measure for patent importance. Overall, we believe 
that the results are not driven by industry differences.  
8. Conclusion 
 This study explores whether the discontinuity around zero analyst forecast errors can 
be explained by the signaling explanation for a sample of patent-intensive firms. Prior 
research finds that there are a disproportionate number of firms that just meet analyst 
forecasts and find evidence of earnings management to achieve this objective (Ayers et al., 
2006; Matsumoto, 2002; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et al., 2005). In addition, Bartov et 
al. (2002) find a positive association between just meeting analyst forecasts and future 
performance. The positive association is consistent with two explanations—signaling and 
attaining benefits that allow better performance in the future. Our research objective is to test 
for signaling while controlling for the confounding effect of the real benefits explanation. 
We focus on a sample of patent-intensive firms included in a unique database on 
patents and patent citations from NBER. This database allows us to construct a proxy for the 
manager’s belief about future firm value due to patents, which helps us test for signaling after 
controlling for the confounding effect of the real benefits explanation. Specifically, we can 
identify potential signaling firms within the sample of firms that just meet the analyst forecast, 
which holds constant the real benefits of just meeting the analyst forecast.  
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We find that firms with more patent citations are more likely to meet the analyst 
forecast relative to firms with fewer citations and firms with more citations are more likely to 
manage earnings to achieve this goal. These results are consistent with the literature and 
suggest that just meeting the analyst forecast creates a separating equilibrium (consistent with 
signaling) that is costly and undertaken by firms with better prospects. Lastly, we find that 
firms with more patent citations have superior performance even within the subsample of 
firms just meeting analyst forecasts. This result suggests that the dominant explanation for the 
discontinuity around the analyst forecast is signaling. We contribute to the literature by 
providing evidence of signaling.  
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Mean Median Std.dev. 1st quartile 3rd quartile
Number of Patents 41.2                   7.0                     122.3                 2.0                     29.0                   
Patent Citations 5.5                     4.0                     6.8                     1.0                     7.4                     
Research & Development 
Expense (millions) 141.6                 21.5                   364.4                 7.0                     86.4                   
Patent Yield 0.749                 0.380                 1.718                 0.170                 0.821                 
Patent Importance 1.003                 0.761                 1.133                 0.410                 1.286                 
R&D Intensity 0.058                 0.040                 0.054                 0.019                 0.082                 
Just Miss 0.140                 0 0.347                 0 0
Just Meet 0.095                 0 0.293                 0 0
Just Beat 0.105                 0 0.306                 0 0
ROA 0.163                 0.153                 0.092                 0.104                 0.216                 
BTM 0.557                 0.487                 0.345                 0.314                 0.715                 
Total Assets (millions) 3,181                 642                    7,350                 177                    2,503                 
Table 1
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the 5,491 firm-years (653 firms) with analyst forecast and patent information
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Table 1 (continued)
Panel B: Pearson correlation
Patent Yieldt
Patent 
Importancet
R&D 
Intensityt Just Meett Just Misst Just Beatt ROAt BTMt SIZEt
Patent Importancet 0.01
R&D Intensityt -0.13*** 0.21***
Just Meett -0.01 0.07*** 0.03**
Just Misst -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.13***
Just Beatt -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.14*** -0.11***
ROAt -0.10*** 0.14*** 0.33*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.10***
BTMt 0.07*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.07*** -0.12*** -0.46***
SIZEt -0.25*** -0.05*** -0.26*** -0.05*** -0.02 0.01 -0.03* -0.08***
Just Mett-1 0.00 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.16*** -0.14*** -0.06***
Patent Yield
Patent Importance
R&D Intensity
Just Meeting
Just Missing
Just Beating
ROA
BTM 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value of equity
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS misses the analyst forecast by one or two cents, zero otherwise
= the number of patents divided by research and development expense (in millions)
= the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents divided by the mean number of patent citations 
received in the current year for all firms  (this controls for the citation truncation problem described in Hall et al. 2005)
= research and development expense divided by total assets
= operating income divided by total assets
= the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS beats the analyst forecast by two or three cents, zero otherwise
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS meets the analyst forecast by zero or one cent, zero otherwise
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Table 2
Frequency
Industry
Mean Industry 
R&D to Assets
Total # of 
Firms
Just Missing 
Analyst Forecast                 
(-1,-2 cents)
Just Meeting 
Analyst Forecast            
(0,1 cent)
Just Beating 
Analyst Forecast               
(2,3 cents)
Industrial machinery and equipment 6.6% 1032 98 113 98
Chemicals and allied products 7.3% 949 118 164 121
Electrical and electronic equipment 7.8% 830 77 136 99
Instruments and related products 7.9% 810 84 153 94
Transportation equipment 3.4% 495 30 55 43
Fabricated metal products 1.8% 190 15 19 13
Primary metal industries 1.6% 172 11 15 8
Paper and allied products 1.8% 153 15 14 16
Food and kindred products 1.1% 130 10 18 22
Rubber and misc. plastics products 3.2% 118 21 24 11
Business services 8.1% 98 9 7 10
Furniture and fixtures 2.0% 96 8 10 11
Oil and gas extraction 1.9% 75 1 4 4
Petroleum and coal products 2.7% 69 2 2 3
Other 274 23 33 23
5,491 522 767 576
The mean industry R&D to assets average is calculated using all firms with patent data and analyst forecast data.  Industry is defined by the 
two-digit SIC code.  A firm is included in the Just Meeting sample if the firm’s realized EPS beats the consensus analyst forecast by zero 
or one cent; a firm is included in the Just Missing sample if the firm misses the consensus analyst forecast by one or two cents;  a firm is 
included in the Just Beating sample if the firm beats the consensus analyst forecast by two or three cents.
Descriptive statistics for the 5,491 firm-years (653 firms) with analyst forecast and patent information
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Just Missing (n=522) Just Meeting (n=767)
Mean Median Mean Median
Patent Yield 0.672 0.336 0.699 0.365
Patent Importance 0.977 0.764 1.195*** 0.801*
R&D Intensity 0.061 0.042 0.062 0.045
ROA 0.185 0.171 0.201*** 0.190***
BTM 0.477 0.414 0.428*** 0.362***
SIZE 6.428 6.239 6.304 6.213
Patent Yield
Patent 
Importance
R&D Intensity
BTM 
ROA
SIZE
Table 3
Univariate statistics between firms just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecast
***/**/* represent statistical significance at 1%/5%/10% levels two-tailed between the Just Missing sample and the 
Just Meeting sample.  A firm is included in the Just Meeting sample if the firm’s realized EPS beats the consensus 
analyst forecast by zero or one cent; a firm is included in the Just Missing sample if the firm misses the consensus 
analyst forecast by one or two cents.
= the number of patents divided by research and development expense (in millions)
= the natural logarithm of market value of equity
= the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents divided by the mean number 
of patent citations received in the current year for all firms  (this controls for the citation truncation 
problem described in Hall et al. 2005)
= research and development expense divided by total assets
= the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity
= operating income divided by total assets
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coefficient p value
Intercept 1.712 (0.00)
Patent Yield 0.002 (0.97)
Patent Importance 0.149 (0.01)
R&D Intensity -0.474 (0.73)
ROA 1.982 (0.02)
BTM -0.357 (0.19)
SIZE -0.108 (0.01)
Year Dummies Yes
Industry Dummies Yes
# that Just Miss 522
# that Just Meet 767
Psuedo R2 0.04
Just Meeting
Patent Yield
Patent Importance
R&D Intensity
ROA
BTM 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value of equity
= the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents divided by 
the mean number of patent citations received in the current year for all firms  (this 
controls for the citation truncation problem described in Hall et al. 2005)
= research and development expense divided by total assets
= the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity
= operating income divided by total assets
Table 4
Logit regression of probability of just meeting versus just missing the anayst forecasts
Dependent variable=Just Meeting
= the number of patents divided by research and development expense (in 
millions)
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS beats the analyst 
forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses the analyst forecast by 
one or two cents
Just Meetingt = γ0 + γ1Patent Yieldt + γ2Patent Importancet + γ3R&D Intensityt + γ4ROAt  
 + γ5BTMt + γ6SIZEt + εt                                                                      (1)  
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coefficient p value
Intercept 1.562 (0.00)
Patent Yield -0.065 (0.23)
Patent Importance 0.121 (0.02)
R&D Intensity -0.927 (0.47)
ROA 1.235 (0.15)
BTM -0.161 (0.57)
SIZE -0.141 (0.00)
Year Dummies Yes
Industry Dummies Yes
# that Just Beat 576
# that Just Meet 767
Psuedo R2 0.03
Just Meeting (vs. 
Just Beating)
Patent Yield
Patent Importance
R&D Intensity
ROA
BTM 
SIZE
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis
Logit regression of probability of just meeting versus just beating the analyst forecasts
Dependent variable=Just Meeting (vs. Just Beating)
= the number of patents divided by research and development expense (in 
millions)
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS beats the analyst 
forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm beats the analyst forecast by two 
or three cents
= the natural logarithm of market value of equity
= the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents divided by 
the mean number of patent citations received in the current year for all firms  (this 
controls for the citation truncation problem described in Hall et al. 2005)
= research and development expense divided by total assets
= the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity
= operating income divided by total assets
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coeffcient p value
Intercept 0.575 (0.34)
Patent Yieldt-1 0.093 (0.24)
Patent Importancet 0.003 (0.96)
R&D Intensityt-1 0.797 (0.57)
ROAt-1 2.145 (0.03)
BTMt-1 -0.411 (0.20)
SIZEt-1 -0.067 (0.16)
Year Dummies Yes
Industry Dummies Yes
# that Just Beat 486
# that Just Meet 666
Psuedo R2 0.04
Just Meeting
Patent Yield
Patent Importance
R&D Intensity
ROA
BTM 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value of equity
= the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents divided by the 
mean number of patent citations received in the current year for all firms  (this controls 
for the citation truncation problem described in Hall et al. 2005)
= research and development expense divided by total assets
= the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity
= operating income divided by total assets
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis
Logit regression of probability of just meeting versus just missing the analyst forecasts in year t-1
Dependent variable=Just Meetingt-1
= the number of patents divided by research and development expense (in millions)
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS beats the analyst 
forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses the analyst forecast by one or 
two cents
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coefficient p value
Intercept 1.637 (0.00)
Patent Yield 0.010 (0.86)
Patent Importance 0.172 (0.00)
R&D Intensity -0.346 (0.78)
Accruals -1.381 (0.23)
Accruals*Patent Importance 0.956 (0.09)
ROA 2.136 (0.01)
BTM -0.255 (0.35)
SIZE -0.113 (0.01)
Year Dummies Yes
Industry Dummies Yes
# that Just Beat 506
# that Just Met 739
Psuedo R2 0.04
Just Meeting
Patent Yield
Patent Importance
R&D Intensity
Accruals
ROA
BTM 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of market value of equity
= the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents divided  
by the mean number of patent citations received in the current year for all firms  
(this controls for the citation truncation problem described in Hall et al. 2005)
= research and development expense divided by total assets
= the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity
= operating income divided by total assets
= abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model controlling for performance
Table 7
Logit regression of probability of just meeting versus just beating the analyst forecasts and abnormal 
accruals
Dependent variable=Just Meeting
= the number of patents divided by research and development expense (in 
millions)
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS beats the analyst 
forecast by zero or one cent, and zero if the firm beats the analyst forecast by 
two or three cents
Just Meetingt = β0 + β1Patent Yieldt + β2Patent Importancet + β3R&D Intensityt + β4Accrualst 
  + β5Accruals*Patent Importancet + β6ROAt + β7BTMt + β8SIZEt + εt       (2) 
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ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3
Intercept 0.004 -0.018 -0.075
(0.78) (0.34) (0.00)
Patent Yield -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
(0.03) (0.21) (0.00)
Patent Importance -0.003 -0.004 0.004
(0.15) (0.19) (0.29)
R&D Intensity -0.013 0.027 -0.049
(0.68) (0.53) (0.34)
Just Meet 0.002 -0.002 0.009
(0.64) (0.76) (0.18)
Just Meet*Patent Importance 0.005 0.006 -0.005
(0.06) (0.06) (0.30)
stdROA 0.021 0.017 0.002
(0.09) (0.33) (0.92)
log(Sales) -0.007 -0.010 -0.014
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
BTM -0.018 0.010 0.039
(0.03) (0.39) (0.00)
logMV 0.009 0.015 0.021
(0.00) (<.0001) (<.0001)
ROA 0.769 0.703 0.651
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 1,241 1,195 1,150
Adj. R2 0.733 0.558 0.452
Just Meeting
Patent Yield
Patent Importance
R&D Intensity
stdROA
log(Sales)
BTM
logMV
ROA
= the ratio of book value to market value of common equity
= the natural logarithm of market value of common equity
= operating income plus R&D expense divided by total assets
= research and development expense divided by total assets
= the standard deviation of ROA during the period from fiscal year t-4 to t
= the natural log of net sales
Table 8
OLS regression of future return on assets on patent importance and just meeting meeting the analyst 
forecast (1983-1998)
Two-tailed. p-values in parentheses.
= an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s realized EPS beats the analyst forecast by 
zero or one cent, and zero if the firm misses the analyst forecast by one or two cents
= the number of patents divided by research and development expense (in millions)
= the mean number of patent citations received on current year patents divided by the 
mean number of patent citations received in the current year for all firms
ROAt+i = µ0 + µ1Patent Yieldt + µ2Patent Importancet + µ3R&D Intensityt + µ4Just Meetingt  
                    + µ5Just Meeting*Patent Importancet + µ6stdROAt + µ7log(Sales)t + µ7BTMt  
   + µ8logMVt + µ9ROAt + εt                                                                                                                            (5) 
 
